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1Forest Rotation under Interdependent Stands:
Ownership Structure and Timing of Decisions
Abstract:
This paper extends the Hartman model to study the optimal rotation age of two
interdependent stands at the steady state, when the rotation ages of the two stands are equal
and the stream of amenities produced from the two stands may be complements or
substitutes, both in space and over time. In the presence of stand interdependence both the
ownership structure and the sequence of decision making matters. Rotation age choices are
examined and compared under a variety of equilibria, including Nash, Stackelberg, and
sole owner cases. We show that the sole owner’s rotation age is longer than the rotation
age under both Nash and Stackelberg assumptions if the stands are spatial complements,
but shorter if they are substitutes. The precise relationship between the Nash and
Stackelberg rotation ages, and the qualitative properties of rotation ages in terms of timber
prices, regeneration costs, and interest rates, also depend on how spatial substitutability
and complementarity between stands evolves through time.
Key words: forest rotation, amenity public goods, stand interdependence, nonindustrial
landowners
JEL classification: Q23, H21.
21. Introduction
Forest ecosystems comprise complex site-specific interactions between plant and
animal species. One aspect of forest ecosystems rarely acknowledged in economics models
is the notion of stand interdependence. The majority of models focus on management of
only a single stand in isolation, but in practice the management of each stand in a given
region should not be undertaken independently of other stands. Biologists have long
known this, arguing that trees of many age classes and species mixes are necessary for
conservation of biodiversity or contiguous habitat for certain animal species. Stand
interdependence may also be anthropogenic in nature. For instance, the recreational
opportunities of larger forest areas may be dependent on the interaction of several stands.
It is well known that landowners, especially non-industrial ones, manage forests
with both timber and non-timber services in mind (Boyd and Hyde 1989). Managing an
interdependent multiple-stand forest is a challenging task. Harvesting even one stand may
sometimes pose a threat to the maintenance of an entire ecosystem. While the task is
difficult enough for one manager, it becomes even harder under the reality of non-
industrial private landownership. Land property rights usually do not follow forest cover
types. Although recent survey work reveals that forest landowners may be willing to
jointly manage land with other landowners, under various ecosystem management
strategies such as preservation of wildlife corridors, the degree of cooperation and
coordination differs and is likely to be far from complete (e.g., see Jacobson 2002). In a
related survey-based study, Klosowski et al. (2001) shows that landowners in the
Northeastern U.S. may be willing to cooperate and make decisions jointly for wildlife, but
only if economic incentives exist for coordinated management. In fact, landowners owning
one piece of an ecosystem may neglect, knowingly or unknowingly, the impact of their
private harvesting on the whole ecosystem or on other nearby landowners.1
The presence of landowners who may not be able (or willing) to coordinate actions
will be socially costly. The impact of one landowner’s decisions on the forest ecosystem
used by another landowner represents a type of economic externality associated with
private forest management. Only a social planner who manages an entire forest ecosystem
                                                          
1 According to Sample (1996) cooperation may be difficult among landowners, especially when
there is heterogeneity of the landscape or landowners are diverse in their preferences for non-
timber services.
 
3as a whole has incentives to solve for the rotation age of each stand, conditional on its
impacts to all other stands.
In this paper we examine several issues not addressed in the economic management
of interdependent forest stands. We assume landowners receive timber and non-timber
amenity benefits that depend on rotation ages of an adjacent stand. By assuming a unique
steady state equilibrium exists, we examine various assumptions for the timing and
implementation of adjacent landowner decisions, when rotation ages are equal. A brief
characterization of our main findings are as follows. If landowners behave without regard
to their effects on another landowner, then the effectively make forest management
decisions simultaneously, i.e., landowners play a Nash game. The Nash game reflects
private ownership in practice, where landowners typically border a small number of
neighbouring landowners and make decisions without regard to the other landowners. An
alternative setting is also examined where one landowner moves first, but makes decisions
with the reaction of another landowner in mind. Finally, we examine the rotation age
decision for a sole owner who makes forest management decisions taking into account the
interdependence between all stands. This is similar to a situation where all landowners
perfectly coordinate, or cooperate in, their actions. Comparison of this outcome with the
simultaneous and first-mover outcomes will show the importance of coordination, and
thereby hint at the social cost of not coordinating forest management actions.
There are very few analytical treatments of the economics problem behind stand
interdependence. Stand interdependence was originally addressed in Bowes and Krutilla
(1985, 1989). They discuss rents associated with multiple stands under a single
(government) owner. Swallow and Wear (1993) and Swallow et al. (1997) were the first to
formulate explicit spatial interactions for non-timber amenity benefits between two
adjacent stands, but they rely mainly on numerical approximations for the case of an
exogenous adjacent stand. Koskela and Ollikainen (2001b) examined analytically the
rotation age decision for a single landowner making decisions for a single stand, also under
the assumption of a purely exogenous adjacent stand. Moreover, their work does not focus
on the different landowner commitment assumptions that we examine, nor do they
examine the important sole owner outcome. All of these issues are critical to
understanding private landowner behavior under various circumstances.
There is a large literature on stand interdependence in other settings, such as
species conservation. This work, when taken in the context of forested areas, promotes the
idea that multiple stands are needed to sustain certain species (see e.g. Csuti et al. 1997,
4Ando et al. 1998, Polasky et al. 2001). An increasing number of empirical studies now
exist on conservation, ecosystem management, and forest management. These are,
however, typically undertaken from the viewpoint of a benevolent social planner (see e.g.
Beavers et al. 1995, Albers 1996, Beavers and Hof 1999, Haight and Travis 1997,
Montgomery 1995). Unlike our paper, this literature either considers only the case of the
sole owner, or it is based on site-specific empirical data. Hence it abstracts from the
interesting practical problems that follow from private landowners who may not coordinate
the management of their forests. Yet coordination may be impractical in the U.S., as many
landowners do not live close to their properties, thus making the sole owner outcome via
cooperation less likely.2
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce an extended
Hartman model of forest management and make specific the definition of spatial
dependence between stands and its evolution over time, i.e. temporal dependence. We then
analyse rotation age decisions under simultaneous move, first-mover and sole owner
timing assumptions and compare their relationships. Section 3 characterizes the qualitative
dependence of rotation ages on important parameters. Finally, in section 4 we provide
some concluding remarks.
2. A model of interdependent stands
We first describe a basic framework for the determination of rotation ages for two
adjacent stands, denoted by stand ''a  and stand ''b . It is assumed that landowners value
net harvest revenue and the non-timber amenity services produced from the stand, just as
in the conventional Hartman model of forest management (Hartman 1976).3 Following
Swallow and Wear (1993) and Koskela and Ollikainen (2001b), we assume that stands are
interdependent in terms of amenities but independent with regard to timber production.
In these models, the growth of stands a and b is an S-shaped function of rotation
age. Timber volume at harvest is denoted by )(Tf  and )(g , where T refers to the
                                                          
2 In North America, there has been much written about absentee landowners who may not be able
to coordinate actions on their land. Others have shown recently that landowners are less interested
in pursuing joint management of forest land if they are not privy to information regarding the
benefits of coordination (Jacobson 2002).
3 Papers including e.g. Binkley (1981) and Kuuluvainen et al. (1996) provide some indirect
empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis that private landowners value non-timber amenity
services.
5rotation age for stand a and τ refers to the rotation age of the stand b. Timber prices p  and
q and regeneration costs Tc  and c for stand a and b, respectively, are allowed to differ
between the stands. These assumptions reflect the typical situation in which stands differ
inherently due to site characteristics (such as slope, tree species, aspect, or access).  Prices,
costs, and the real interest rate r are assumed to be constant over time, as with the basic
Hartman model. The present values of timber production over an infinite cycle of rotations
for each stand are, respectively,
 TrTrTa ceTpfeV   )()1( 1  (1a)
 


 ceqgeV rrb   )()1( 1  .  (1b)
We now introduce amenity values in a manner that reflects stand interdependence.
Let ),( sF a describe valuation of amenity benefits provided by stand a at time s and as a
function of the adjacent stand b’s rotation age of  . Likewise, ),( xTF b  denotes valuation
of amenity benefits of stand b at time x when stand a has a rotation age of T . Using this
notation, the present value of amenities over an infinite series of rotations of length T and
 for both stands are written,
dsesFeE rs
T arTa 

0
1 ),()1(   (2a)
 dxexTFeE rxbrb  


0
1 ),()1( . (2b)
Equations (2a) and (2b) reflect the steady-state amenity valuation under certain
limiting assumptions. As pointed out in Swallow and Wear (1993), the presence of
interdependency might imply that the amenity value of each stand depends on the current
calendar age of the adjacent stand. In particular, if the rotation ages of the two stands
differ, the dynamics of any steady-state will depend not only on the rotation ages of the
stands, but also on the calendar age of the stands. Under these circumstances, one cannot
approximate the present value of amenity benefits using equations (2a) and (2b). In
Appendix 1 we illustrate an extension of the model by introducing calendar age into (2a) –
(2b). Using ex ante given and different rotation ages in a numerical example, Appendix 1
6describes how rotation age and actual age of stands interact as the number of rotations is
increased.
Equations (2a) and (2b) reflect a case where the interdependent steady-state
rotation ages are identical. While this appears to be restrictive, it allows us to develop a
qualitative theory of stand interdependency in its simplest form. Such an approach is
similar to one proposed in an important contribution of Tobin and Houthakker (1950-
1951). They analysed the effects of credit rationing by restricting attention to a margin
where rationed and free market solutions were assumed identical.  Then, they proceeded
with an assessment of the marginal effects of rationing. We follow their approach in spirit
by assuming rotation ages are identical, and then examining the behavior of the steady-
state within this margin. Most previous forest economics work assumes the existence of a
steady state, like we do.  Very few studies elaborate on possible transitional dynamics that
might arise outside of the steady state. An example is Swallow and Wear (1993), who
provide numerical simulation results for stand interdependency in the case of an
exogenous adjacent stand. That said, a first and natural step towards developing the
analytics of stand interdependency that does not require numerical simulation is to detect
the marginal effects of exogenous parameters and agents’ behaviour for any form of stand
interdependency.4
Proceeding under the assumptions of a unique steady state and equal rotation ages,
equations (2a) and (2b) define a valuation function of amenity benefits for each stand in
terms of its own and the adjacent stand rotation ages. The choice of these rotation ages is
made for an infinite series of rotations begun at time t = 0, following the Hartman and
Faustmann models. In these models, given that the choice of rotation age is made under
certainty and exogenous variables remain constant over time, all future rotations will be
similar in terms of the path of timber and amenity flows forever.  Thus, in this case, the
rotation age choice is the appropriate indicator of the path of amenity services consumed
by the landowner.
For subsequent analysis we must also characterize how the amenity values in
equations (2a) and (2b) behave in terms of changes in their own rotation age and changes
in the adjacent stand’s rotation age.  In describing these effects, we will use the label own-
                                                          
4 Providing sufficient conditions for the existence of a steady state or specifying the transitional
dynamics governing the possible equilibria, which may include steady state, cyclical, chaotic or
other solutions, goes beyond the scope of this paper but is certainly an important future research
topic.
7stand to refer to the stand in question, and adjacent stand to refer to the other stand.
Neglecting for a moment the present value terms in (2a) and (2b), and differentiating the
integrals for each stand with respect to the own rotation age, we can obtain a marginal
amenity valuation function defined at harvest times for both stand a and b: Denote these as
),( TF a  and ),( TF b  respectively.
We now present two definitions from the literature, which characterize spatial
dependence of stands, as well as the evolution of this over time, i.e., temporal dependence.
Differentiating each stand’s marginal amenity valuation function with respect to the
rotation age of the adjacent stand indicates how the marginal amenity valuation changes
with respect to changes in the rotation age of the other stand. These derivatives define
spatial dependence in the literature and are summarized in:5
Definition 1 (Koskela and Ollikainen 2001b). Spatial Dependence
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Definition 1 is consistent with ALEP complementarity/substitutability first
formalized by Samuelson (1974) and others in a different context.6 If the stands are spatial
substitutes, then the marginal amenity valuation of each stand decreases with the rotation
age of the adjacent stand.  If the stands are spatial complements, then the opposite is true,
i.e., marginal amenities of each stand increase with the rotation age of the adjacent stand.
It is also important to know how spatial dependence between stands is affected by
rotation age choices. This is obtained by differentiating the functions in Definition 1 with
respect to own-stand rotation ages. The resulting second derivatives define how spatial
dependence between stands evolves with own rotation age. This is called ‘temporal
dependence’ in the literature. That is,
                                                          
5 In what follows, derivatives of functions will be denoted by subscripts unless otherwise noted.
6 For the concept of the Auspitz-Liebig-Edgeworth-Pareto (ALEP) complementarity/
substitutability, see Samuelson (1974) and further discussions in Chipman (1977), Kannai (1980)
and Weber (2000) regarding its implications for the properties of demand functions.
8Definition 2 (Koskela and Ollikainen 2001b). Temporal Dependence
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From Definition 2, temporal interdependence between two stands may be constant,
increasing or decreasing depending on how spatial dependence between the stands changes
with increases in the rotation age of each stand. Temporal independence results when
),( 

TF aT 0 ),(  TF
b
T . This is the case if spatial substitutability or complementarity
(from Definition 1) is merely associated with site-specific properties that remain the same
regardless of own-stand rotation age. Increasing temporal dependence between the stands
means that, for spatial complements, the complementarity between stands increases with
own-stand rotation age. But for spatial substitutes, the substitutability between stands
decreases with own-stand rotation age. Decreasing temporal dependence implies just the
opposite: complementarity weakens while substitutability becomes stronger for increases
in own-stand rotation age.
Ecologists have shown that amenity production depends on inter-stand
relationships like the ones above in Definitions 1 and 2 (see, for example Franklin and
Forman (1987) and Giles (1978). As a forestry example of spatial substitutes and
complements consider the case of a landowner who values timber and forage production
consistent with big game production, where big game requires both forage and cover (see
e.g. Swallow and Wear 1993). The own stand and the adjacent stand function in this case
exist as substitutes in their production of this amenity, as long as they simultaneously
provide both forage and cover. The stands are complements if instead, for example, the
own stand provides only forage while the adjacent stand provides only cover. This type of
example has special relevance to “ecosystem management” in the U.S. This embodies the
holistic management of land in corridors advocated for wildlife habitat protection
(Grumbine 1994, Moote and Cortner 1994). Here, corridors function as complementary
stands between the stands they are joining. Another example relates to production of water
and forest goods discussed in Bowes, Krutilla and Sherman (1984) and Bowes and Krutilla
(1989). In their examples, the species composition of trees in a forest (i.e., stands
comprising either coniferous or leaf trees) as well as their location on the landscape, are
9important both to water quality and the likelihood of floods and other hydrological
properties. Thus, stands may be complements or substitutes in the production of water.
The case of increasing or decreasing temporal dependence is more complex.
Consider the first example. Suppose that the stands are originally spatial substitutes and
the adjacent stand rotation age increases. If this decreases (increases) forage and cover for
the own stand, due to changes in understory vegetation, then we have the case of
decreasing (increasing) temporal dependence between stands. One therefore expects that
temporal dependence is important in the case of biodiversity conservation. Typical old-
growth species, such as red-cockaded woodpecker, spotted owl or carpagalle, require
significant stands of old timber for their propagation. While some old growth species are
highly specialized to old growth forests, others are to a lesser extent.7 Therefore,
increasing the age of old growth stands makes the forest more (less) suitable to highly
(less) specialized species thus inducing stronger (weaker) interdependence between stands.
In our model these situations would be labelled as increasing (decreasing) temporal
dependence respectively.
2.1 Three models for rotation age
We now depart from the existing literature and consider rotation age solutions for
different ownership structures and timing of decisions. The first rotation age solution
corresponds to a Nash game, where there are two different landowners who own stands a
and b, and these landowners make their harvesting decisions simultaneously taking the
other’s action as given. This mimics the private market solution where landowners take the
behavior of others as given. The second rotation age solution follows when there are two
landowners, but one is a first-mover, i.e., landowners play a traditional two-stage
Stackelberg game. The landowner moving first is assumed able to credibly commit to a
harvesting decision before the other landowner moves, so that a leader-follower
relationship is established. Finally, the third rotation age solution is derived under the
assumption of a sole owner of both stands a and b. This can be interpreted as the case
where landowners coordinate their decisions.
                                                          
7 As metapopulation theory has shown, these species do not occupy all stands, but still a
sufficiently high amount of old growth stands are needed (see e.g. Hanski 1998).
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In all cases, landowners are assumed to be price takers and, as such, do not account
for price-induced demand changes when making rotation age choices.  Each landowner
does, however, make use of amenities produced by the other stand. Therefore, the sole
owner model, by yielding the efficient solution, provides a hint at the social costs
associated with uncoordinated harvesting if there are no externalities outside the
landowners’ control.
2.2. Rotation ages in the Nash game
Here each landowner chooses rotation age taking the other landowner’s rotation choice as
given by maximizing aaaN EV   and bbbN EV  . The solution to the Nash game
can be obtained for each landowner by solving the following problems simultaneously:
aaaN
T
EVMax 
}{
      (3a)
bbbN EVMax 
}{
 , (3b)
where the terms in the objective functions are defined in (1) and (2). The labels a and
b again refer both to the stand and landowner, and N denotes the Nash game.
The following first-order conditions characterize the optimal rotations T and :
aaaaN
T rErVTrpfTFTfp  )(),()(: 0  (4a)
bbbbN rErVrqgTFgq  )(),()(:0 

. (4b)
These suggest that both landowners equate their private marginal benefit of delaying
harvest (LHS) to the marginal opportunity cost of delaying harvest (RHS). Notice there is
an externality evident in the first-order conditions (affecting the last terms on the LHS and
RHS of (4a) and (4b)). This arises because landowners do not account for the effect of
their rotation age choice on the other landowner’s utility and behavior.
The second-order conditions for both landowners are given by
0),()´()´´(  TFTrpfTpf aT
aN
TT (5a)
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0),()´()´´(  

TFrqgqg bbN (5b)
We assume that the second-order conditions (5a) and (5b) hold. They hold automatically
when the landowner’s marginal amenity valuation decreases or remains constant with
increasing own-stand rotation age, i.e., for 0aTF and 0
bF

. They may not always hold
when the landowner’s amenity valuation increases with own-stand rotation ages, i.e., for
0aTF and 0
bF

 (see Strang 1983).
As for the dynamics of the Nash equilibrium, we assume that landowners adjust
their rotation ages in order to increase the sum of net present value of harvest revenue and
amenities, taking the behavior of the other landowner as given. These dynamics are
represented by the following derivatives,








	
T
aT
TaN
   and  







	



bT
bN        (5c)
where the parameters 0, T  indicate the speed of adjustment, and the dots refer to
“artificial” time, reflecting dynamic adjustments to rotation ages over time (see e.g.
Takayama 1988, pp. 302-313).
The uniqueness and stability condition for the Nash game can be expressed as
0 bNT
aN
T
bNaN
TT
N

, (5d)
where  
T
rsarTaaN
T dsesFerTF
0
1 ),()1(),( 

 and




0
1 ),()1(),( dxexTFerTF rxbT
rb
T
bN
T , so that the determinant of the second-
order derivatives matrix in (5d) must be positive.8 The second order conditions (5a) – (5b)
imply that the first part of (5d) is positive.  Therefore, the uniqueness and stability of the
Nash game depends on the product of cross-derivatives bNT
aN
T   , which jointly with the
second-order conditions define the slopes of the reaction functions for the landowners.
                                                          
8 For further details about uniqueness and stability, see Dixit (1986) and Vives (1999, pp. 49-58).
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The reaction functions for landowner a  and b respectively can be obtained from
the first-order conditions by totally differentiating them with respect to the rotation age of
adjacent stands,
aN
TT
aN
T
a
a
d
dT






)( , bN
bN
T
b
Tb
dT
d





 )( .  (6)
Lemma 1 characterizes how the cross derivatives of the reaction functions depend on
properties of the amenity valuation functions.
Lemma 1. 00
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Proof. See Appendix 2.
According to Lemma 1 and equation (6), the reaction functions of landowners a  and
b have different slopes depending on temporal stand interdependence (Definition 2). There
are three cases, which we summarize in:
Result 1. Properties of the reaction functions
a) Under temporally independent stands, the reaction functions are vertical lines in
(T,) space and the equilibrium is stable.
b) Under increasing temporal dependence, the reaction functions are increasing in
(T,) space.  Stability of the equilibrium requires that the reaction function for
stand a is steeper than the reaction function for stand b.
c) Under decreasing temporal dependence, the reaction functions are decreasing in
(T,) space. Stability of the equilibrium requires that the reaction function for stand
a is steeper than the reaction function for stand b.
Result 1 is illustrated in Figures 1-4 for both decreasing and increasing temporal
dependence. Drawn in the figures are the reaction functions for the landowner of stand a
and b, )(a  and )(Tb , each of which is a function of the rotation age choice of the other
landowner. In Figures 1–2 the reaction functions are downward-sloping, reflecting
decreasing temporal dependence between the stands. The upward sloping reaction
13
functions in Figures 3 and 4 reflect increasing temporal dependence between the stands.
As we explain later, Figures 1 and 3 are drawn assuming the stands are spatial substitutes,
while Figures 2 and 4 are drawn assuming the stands are spatial complements. The unique
and stable Nash equilibrium solution satisfying (4a) and (4b) occurs at the point where the
reaction functions for the landowners cross.
2.3. Rotation ages in the Stackelberg game
In the Stackelberg game, the leader moves with knowledge of how the following
landowner responds; the follower takes the rotation age of the leader as given. While this
model may mimic some private market situations, the leader might also be interpreted as a
government formally setting a long run harvest policy, effectively leading.
Assume the leader is the landowner holding stand a. This landowner maximizes the
following objective function,
aaaS
T
EVMax 
}{
             (7a)
),,,(..

 crqTts SS  ,            (7b)
where the superscript S refers to the Stackelberg game, and ),,,(

 crqT SS   describes
the reaction function of the follower (who holds stand b). Utilizing the Nash first-order
condition (4b) for the follower’s reaction function, the leader and the follower first-order
conditions are, respectively,
0
0
 

T
rsa
T
rTaN
T
aS
T dsesFe ),((.)   , (8a)
0)(),()(  bbbbS rErVrqgTFgq 

. (8b)
We assume that the second-order condition holds for this problem.9 In reality, whether it
holds depends again on the amenity valuation function and on the properties of the
follower’s reaction function ),,,(

 crqT SS  .
                                                          
9  Thus we assume that ),())()(( TFeTrpfTfpre arTrTaNTTaSTT  
0),(2),(),(
0
2
0
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 
rTa
T
T
rsa
T
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TT eTFdsesFdsesF   .
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Consider first the follower’s behavior given in (8b). This condition is qualitatively
the same as the necessary condition for landowner b in the Nash game; that is, given ST ,
the follower chooses the rotation age  . This is not so for the leader (eqn (8a)). Compared
to the Nash game, there is an additional term in the Stackelberg first order condition,
reflecting the impact of the follower’s rotation choice on the leader’s marginal amenity
benefits. The presence of this additional term implies that the leader partly accounts for the
externality that arises from the effect of the follower’s rotation age on the amenities of the
leader’s stand. This difference between Stackelberg and Nash outcomes will become
important later when we study comparative statics effects.
Whether the leader has a longer or shorter rotation age compared to the Nash
equilibrium rotation age depends on the last term in (8a), i.e., on the slope of the follower’s
reaction curve and the integral term. To sign this integral term and make the analysis
tractable, we assume that the amenity function has a quadratic shape, and we also use a
second order approximation for ))2/1(1(1 22TrrTe rT  .10 The quadratic amenity
function 221 )()(),(   TTTF
a  has the following properties:
)(),(   TTF aT  and 0)(),(   TF
a
T as 0)( , so that it exhibits all
relevant cases described in Definitions 1 and 2. We now have,
Lemma 2. Under the quadratic amenity valuation function,
2
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Proof. See Appendix 3.
According to Lemma 2 the sign of the integral term depends on how the rotation
age of the follower’s stand affects the marginal amenity valuation of the leader’s stand at
the margin, when .0T  Returning to Figures 1-4, consider now the iso-net-present-value-
of-revenue curves. The iso-net-present-value-of-revenue curves are lines along which the
net present value is constant for given interest rates, timber prices and regeneration costs.
A family of these therefore exist for each set of constant parameters.
                                                          
10  We can show that higher order approximations for the discount factor will not change the nature
of the results in Lemma 2 below.
15
When the stands are spatial substitutes, the iso-net-present-value-of-revenue curves
are decreasing in the rotation age of the other stand, while spatial complements imply the
iso-net-present-value-of-revenue curves are increasing in the rotation age of the other
stand.  This means that, for complements (substitutes) the net present value of profits for
the forest landowner is increasing when moving up (down) the reaction functions. In the
figures, the Stackelberg rotation age for leader and follower corresponding to (8a) – (8b)
above is defined by the point where the leader’s highest iso-net-present-value-of-revenue
curve is tangent to the follower´s reaction function, ).(Tb
Using Figures 1-4, Lemma 2, Lemma 1, and Result 1, we can now examine the
relationship between the Nash and the Stackelberg rotation ages. Consider first the leader.
If the stands are temporally independent, then 0(.) aTF  and the reaction functions are
vertical lines. Here, the sign of ),( 

TF a  does not matter, therefore, the Stackelberg
rotation age coincides with the Nash rotation age. Under decreasing (increasing) temporal
dependence and spatial substitutability between the stands, we have 0aNT  ( 0
aN
T ),
because now the last term in (8a) is positive (negative). In this case, the leader’s rotation
age, ST , is longer (shorter) than the Nash rotation age, NT . If the stands are spatial
complements, then under decreasing (increasing) temporal dependence we have 0aNT
( 0aNT ); now the leader’s rotation age is shorter (longer) than the Nash rotation age. For
spatial substitutes (complements), the follower’s rotation age is shorter (longer) than the
Nash rotation age under decreasing temporal dependence.
The interpretation is as follows. The follower observes the rotation age of the
leader prior to moving. When the stands are substitutes, the follower’s rotation age must be
shorter because, under decreasing temporal dependence, the leader’s rotation age will be
longer than the Nash rotation age, and the follower’s reaction curve will be downward-
sloping (Figure 1). Intuitively, the longer rotation age of the leader allows the follower to
harvest sooner but still derive foregone amenity benefits from the leader’s stand. For
spatial complements, the leader’s rotation age is shorter than the Nash age, and the best
response of the follower is to lengthen the rotation age relative to Nash age, because that
decreases stand complementarity. Similar reasoning can be applied to increasing temporal
dependence.
We can summarize the above discussion in:
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Proposition 1. The relationship between Nash and Stackelberg rotation ages depends on
the nature of stand interdependence:
a) Under temporal  independence, SN TT   and SN   .
b) Under decreasing temporal dependence, SN TT   and SN    for spatial
complements, while SN TT   and SN     for spatial substitutes.
c) Under increasing temporal dependence, SN TT   and SN     for spatial
complements, while SN TT   and SN   for spatial substitutes.
2.4. Rotation ages for the sole owner
The sole owner chooses rotation ages of both stands to maximize,
 
baba
T
EEVVWMax 
,
 . (9)
The first-order conditions characterizing sole owner rotation age choices can be
expressed using the following modification of the Nash conditions (4a) and (4b),
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The second-order conditions 0TTW , 0W , and 0
SO are presented in Appendix 4
and are assumed to hold.
Equations (10a) and (10b) imply that the sole owner chooses rotation ages for both
stands taking into account how amenities are affected by rotation age of both stand a (as in
the Stackelberg game) and now also stand b (see the last term in 10a and 10b). Hence, all
potential externalities arising from the effects of harvesting one stand on the other stand’s
amenities are internalized. The sole owner outcome is therefore the efficient solution for
our problem.
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The last terms in equations (10a) and (10b) determine how the sole-owner rotation
age of both stands compares to Nash and Stackelberg rotation ages. From Lemma 2 we
know that these last terms are positive when the stands are spatial complements and
negative when the stands are spatial substitutes. Thus, relative to the Nash rotation age, the
sole owner chooses longer rotation ages for both stands when they are spatial
complements, but shorter rotation ages when they are spatial substitutes.
How does the sole owner rotation age compare to the Stackelberg rotation age? The
sole owner first order conditions differ from the Stackelberg conditions by the last term
(compare (10a) with (8a)). Due to the symmetric sole owner first-order conditions (10a)
and (10b), we can graphically distinguish the sole owner optimum in Figures 1-4 as points
where the iso-net-present-value-of-revenue-curves from both stands are tangent to each
other. Referring to the figures, for spatial complements (substitutes) the sole owner
rotation age is longer (shorter) than the Stackelberg age for both leader and follower.
The important driving factor in the comparison of the sole owner’s rotation age
with Nash and Stackelberg rotation ages is the spatial complementarity or substitutability
of stands. The sole owner internalizes all externalities associated with amenities. When
stands are temporally independent, it is natural that the sole owner rotation age coincides
with the other rotation ages because there is no external effect of harvesting one stand on
the other stand. However this is not the case when stands are temporally interdependent.
Now the comparison of rotation ages depends on how the two stands are related spatially;
if they are spatial complements, the sole owner increases rotation ages, while the opposite
is true under spatial substitutes. We can express the relationship between Nash,
Stackelberg and sole owner rotation ages as follows
Proposition 2.
a) Under temporal independence, the spatial complementarity or substitutability between
the stands does not matter and Nash and Stackelberg rotation ages coincide with the
sole owner rotation ages.
b) Under temporal dependence, the sole owner rotation age is longer (shorter) than Nash
and Stackelberg solutions when stands are spatial complements (substitutes).
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The differences in rotation ages under our various solutions will undoubtedly lead to
differences in welfare for forest landowners.11  Obviously, landowners are by definition
better off at the sole owner optimum relative to the other outcomes. An interesting
comparison of welfare under the other outcomes can be obtained from Figures 1-4, by
noting the position of the equilibria on the iso-net-present-value-of-revenue curves.
Figures 3-4 show that when temporal dependence is increasing, the welfare of both
landowners is higher under the Stackelberg solution than under the Nash equilibrium. This
result occurs because in the Stackelberg game, the leader partially accounts for the effects
of his rotation age decision on the follower landowner, and this increases the welfare of
both leader and follower. In the case of decreasing temporal dependence, Figures 1-2 show
that the welfare comparison between Nash and Stackelberg solutions is ambiguous. Thus,
we have an additional Corollary:12
Corollary 1.   Under increasing temporal independence, both landowners are better off
when rotation ages are chosen according to the Stackelberg game, relative to the case
when rotation ages are solved under the Nash equilibrium.
3. Comparative Static Analysis
We have shown that the Nash, Stackelberg, and sole owner rotation ages differ from each
other in the presence of amenity benefits when there is stand interdependence. Now we
study the qualitative properties of these rotation ages. An important point to realize is that
market parameters for both stands can differ given that site characteristics inherent to both
                                                          
11 What happens if only one of the two owners values amenities? Suppose only landowner a values
amenity services. In the Nash equilibrium, landowner b ’s reaction function would then be a
vertical line in ( T, ) space. If landowner b  is the Stackelberg follower, then the integral term in
(8a) would equal zero because of this reaction function. Finally, in the sole owner case stand a  is
managed like in the conventional Hartman model.  However, stand b is not managed like in the
Faustmann model, because the effect of its rotation age on amenities provided by stand a  are
taken into account.
12 Hamilton and Slutsky (1990) have shown that, in models of endogenous timing regarding the
decisions of firms, there are incentives for firms to move sequentially if there is one Stackelberg
equilibria that Pareto dominates all other simultaneous move Nash equilibria. With two firms, the
necessary condition for the Stackelberg to obtain is that the leader’s profits are higher when
moving first, compared to its profits in the Nash game, otherwise no firm would choose to move
first and both would, effectively, play a Nash game. A sufficient condition for this is that both
leader and follower profits in the sequential move game are at least as high as their Nash profits.
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stands could differ, and their rotation ages are not generally equivalent, as we showed
above. The results of this section are condensed in Table 1.
3.1 Nash game
For the effect of a timber price p of stand a on both rotation ages we obtain, through total
differentiation of the first order conditions,
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TF aT  (see Koskela-Ollikainen 2001b).
Given that the present value of regeneration costs is always positive, we have the
conventional effect of a shorter rotation age due to an increase in the own-stand harvesting
price when 0),( TF aT  (i.e., the marginal amenity valuation increases or remains
constant with the age of stands).
Equation (12b) reveals that the rotation age of stand b may also be affected by a
change in stand a’s timber price if the stands are not temporally independent, i.e., if
0bNT . Assuming that the marginal amenity valuation does not decrease with the age of
the own stand, the other landowner will shorten (lengthen) his rotation age as a result of a
rise in p  when temporal dependence between stands is increasing (decreasing). Note that
the signs of NqT  and 
N
q  are symmetric given (12a) and (12b).
To assess the impacts of a change in regeneration costs of stand a, Tc , on rotation
ages, we obtain
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Thus, the effect of an increase in the own-stand regeneration cost is qualitatively the same
as in the Faustmann and Hartman model-based literature. However, with respect to the
adjacent stand, the Nash solution brings a new result, from (13b). The reaction of the
adjacent stand’s landowner to a change in the regeneration costs of the other landowner
depends on the temporal dependence between stands. More specifically, if the dependence
between the stands increases (decreases) with a longer rotation age for the own stand, then
the owner of the adjacent stand lengthens (shortens) his rotation age. Again, the signs of
N
cT

 and Nc

  are symmetric, given (13a) and (13b).
Finally, for a change in the real interest rate we obtain,
 aNTbNrbNaNTrNNrT  
1  (14a)
 bNTaNTraNTTbNrNNr  
1 , (14b)
where 0aNTr  and 0
bN
r . Under increasing temporal dependence both rotation ages
will unambiguously shorten from (14a) and (14b). However, under decreasing temporal
dependence the effect is a priori ambiguous. Naturally, a sufficient condition for a shorter
rotation age here is that the own-stand direct effect of the interest rate dominates all other
effects. Summarizing we have
Result 2. In a symmetric Nash equilibrium with interdependent stands,
a) A higher own-stand price shortens the rotation age under increasing temporal
dependence, but may increase rotation age under strong decreasing temporal
dependence.  The effect of own-stand regeneration cost on rotation age is positive.
b) The effects of higher adjacent-stand timber price and regeneration costs on the own-
stand rotation age depend on the nature of temporal dependence between the stands.
c) A higher interest rate decreases rotation ages under increasing temporal dependence,
but is a priori ambiguous under decreasing temporal dependence
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3.2 Stackelberg game
In the Stackelberg game we have only to solve the comparative statics for the leader’s
rotation age.13 A change in the timber price for stand a impacts the leader’s rotation age as
follows
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where )1()()()( rTrTaSTp eeTrfTrfTf

  and
aarT
T rETFercA 
 ),()1( 1  .
Recall from Result 1 that the sign of the reaction function T (.) depends on
temporal dependence between the stands, and that from Lemma 2 the sign of the integral
term depends on whether the stands are spatial complements or substitutes. We can first
see that if the stands are temporally independent ( 0aTF  ), then the last term in (15) is
zero. Thus, the price effect on the Stackelberg rotation age is identical to the price effect
on rotation age in the single stand Hartman model. Second, a combination of increasing
marginal valuation, spatial complements and increasing temporal dependence, or spatial
substitutes with decreasing temporal dependence, implies unambiguously the conventional
effect of a shorter rotation age.
Given that the Stackelberg game is not symmetric like the Nash game, we next
solve for the effect of the price of stand b on the leader’s rotation age. Differentiating the
first-order condition (8a) with respect to this price ( q ) and noting that all effects emerge
from the follower’s response function, we obtain,
aS
TT
aS
TqS
qT


 .  (16)
We show in Appendix 5 that, while this price effect is a priori ambiguous for both
decreasing and increasing temporal dependence, it is zero for temporally independent
                                                          
13 Comparative statics for the follower is identical to the case of an exogenous adjacent stand; this
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stands. The ambiguity under non-constant temporal dependence results from the fact that
the direct and indirect effects of timber price q  are offsetting (via a shift in the follower’s
reaction function and its slope).
The effect of higher regeneration cost of the leader’s stand on the leader’s rotation
age is given by,
0
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0ScT
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,   (17b)
Hence, the leader’s rotation age unambiguously lengthens. The interpretation of this
finding is the same as before. If the regeneration cost of the follower’s stand increases, it
affects the leader’s first-order condition only via the reaction function of the follower.
Given that 0(.)

 Tc , there is no effect on the rotation age of the leader’s stand.
Finally, the effect of an interest rate change on the leader’s rotation age can be
expressed as,
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According to this expression for aSTr , the interest rate effect arises through three channels:
directly i) through the profitability of the leader’s stand, and indirectly both ii) via the
slope of the reaction function, and iii) through the position of the follower’s reaction
function. In Appendix 5 we show via Lemma 3 that these effects counter each other, so
that the overall impact of the interest rate is ambiguous. We can summarize our findings
in:
Result 3. In a Stackelberg equilibrium with interdependent stands,
                                                                                                                                                                              
case has been analyzed in Koskela-Ollikainen (2001b).
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a) Under increasing marginal amenity valuation, an increase in the leader’s own-stand
price will shorten the leader’s rotation age when the stands are spatial complements
with increasing temporal dependence, or spatial substitutes with decreasing temporal
dependence. A higher own-stand regeneration cost increases the leader’s rotation age
unambiguously.
b) An increase in the follower’s own-stand price has an a priori ambiguous effect on
rotation age when stands are not temporally independent, while higher own-stand
regeneration costs for the follower have no effect on the leaders’ rotation age.
c) A higher interest rate has an a priori ambiguous effect on the leader’s rotation age.
3.3. Sole owner solution
Finally, we consider comparative statics in the sole owner case.  For the effect of higher
timber price of stand a on both rotation ages we have,
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By using the first-order conditions (1a) and (10b), we can show that: sgn TpW  = -
sgn 


  
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0
),( dxexTFA rxbT , where 
aarT
T rETFercA 
 ),()1(  . The sufficient
conditions for TpW < 0, and the impact of own-stand price on the rotation age to be
negative, are that marginal amenity valuations are non-decreasing with the rotation age of
the stand )0(.)( aTF  and the stands are spatial complements )0(.)( 
b
TF (see Lemma 2).
Under the sufficient condition for TpW < 0, the effect of the adjacent stand price on own-
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stand rotation age is negative under increasing temporal dependence and positive under
decreasing temporal dependence; because according to Lemma 1 0)(TW , as the
temporal dependence between stands increases (decreases). Thus, the price effects here
resemble the classic case of complements and substitutes, except in our model
complementarity is specified in a temporal sense.
The effect of a change in the own-stand regeneration costs of stand a on the
rotation age is given by,
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A higher own-stand regeneration cost lengthens own rotation age, while its effect on the
other stand depends again on the temporal dependence between stands. The rotation age of
the other stand lengthens under increasing temporal dependence and shortens under
decreasing temporal dependence.
Finally, for the effects of an increase in the real interest rate we have,
 
 TrTr
SOSO
r WWWWT 
1  (21a)
 TTrTTr
SOSO
r WWWW  
1 ,  (21b)
where








	


 

 
00
2 ),(
1),()1(
)1()1(
dxexTxF
T
dxexTFe
e
T
e
eW rxbT
rxb
T
rT
rT
aN
TrrT
rT
Tr








	


 

 T
rsa
T
rsarT
r
bN
rr
r
r dsessFdsesFeee
eW
00
2 ),(
1),()1(
)1()1(







The first terms in TrW  and rW  are negative. In Appendix 6 we show that, under plausible
assumptions concerning the interest rate and rotation ages, the braced terms are negative if
the stands are spatial complements. Thus, under increasing temporal dependence and
spatial complementarity of stands, both rotation ages will unambiguously shorten;
otherwise the effects are a priori ambiguous. We therefore have,
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Result 4. In the case of a sole owner with interdependent stands,
a) A higher own-stand price shortens rotation age if stands are either spatial
complements, and temporal dependence is either unchanged or increasing. A higher
own-stand regeneration cost unambiguously lengthens the rotation age
b) Under a certain sufficient condition, the effect of the adjacent stand price on own-
stand rotation age depends on the nature of temporal dependence. The effect of the
adjacent stand’s regeneration cost will increase (decrease) the own-stand rotation age
under increasing (decreasing) temporal dependence.
c) If stands are spatial complements and temporal interdependence is increasing, then a
higher interest rate will shorten the rotation ages. 14
4. Discussion and Policy Implications
Sustaining forest ecosystems requires that stands are managed in concert rather
than in isolation.  Most forest economics models, however, consider only a single isolated
stand or a single landowner. This is not necessarily the case for private land ownership,
where individual property rights make proper coordination of management decisions
across large numbers of landowners very difficult. The lack of coordination among
landowners can be detrimental to amenities that depend on the ecosystem as a whole, such
as those derived from recreational experiences or the existence of certain wildlife species.
Under the assumption that rotation ages are identical in the steady state, we have
examined the possibility that stands can be temporally or spatially interdependent in
different ways regarding the production of amenities by allowing for several cases of
landowner decision timing and commitment, including landowners making simultaneous
decisions, landowners coordinating their actions, or one landowner acting as a first mover.
Our results extend the basic Hartmann model of forest management that first introduced
                                                          
14 Suppose that in the case of sole owner solution both stand a  and stand b have the same timber
price or regeneration cost change. Then assuming that 0TpW  a higher timber price will decrease
both rotation ages when marginal amenity valuations are non-decreasing with the rotation age of
stands and temporal dependence between stands is non-decreasing. The effect of changes in the
uniform regeneration cost is positive (ambiguous) when temporal dependence between stands is
increasing (decreasing). Proofs are available upon request.
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amenities for the case of an isolated stand, as well as other models of multiple stands based
on numerical simulations or the assumption of only sole ownership.
We demonstrate that rotation age decisions depend on how adjacent stands are
spatially and temporally dependent with regards to amenity valuation, and on the structure
of landowner decision timing. Sole ownership represents the social optimum in our model.
Comparing this with the Nash and Stackelberg outcomes gives a qualitative indication of
the social costs associated with landowners who do not seek to jointly maximize total
revenue and amenity rents from owning forests.
The collective results from our paper are summarized in Propositions 1, 2,
Corollary 1, and Table 1. The sole owner’s rotation age is longer than the Nash and
Stackelberg rotation ages if the stands are spatial complements, but shorter if they are
spatial substitutes with regard to marginal amenity valuation. Additionally, the relationship
between the Nash and Stackelberg rotation ages also depends on how this substitutability
and complementarity evolves over time. The differences between these solutions largely
reflect the ability (or inability) of landowners to either benefit from another landowner’s
decisions. Interestingly, we show that under increasing temporal interdependence, it can be
the case that one landowner moving first may make both landowners better off relative to
the case where they do not coordinate at all and play a Nash game.
As a basis for policy analysis, we also characterize in these new models how
rotation ages depend on timber prices, interest rates, and regeneration costs. We find that
the effects of these parameters, derived in single stand models, does not usually hold.
Instead, the results depend on the spatial and temporal dependence between the stands, the
ability of landowners to commit to harvesting, and whether the parameters changing are
for the stand in question or the adjacent stand. By and large, most of the differences
between our models and existing models occur for two reasons. First, the possibility of
increasing or decreasing temporal dependence often determines the signs of comparative
statics results, for instance, the interest rate effect on rotation age (for instance) is not
necessarily negative like in existing models with one forest stand (see Table 1). Second,
stand interdependence implies that parameters from one stand can affect the choices made
in the other stand, as exemplified by our price and regeneration cost effects.
Our new results and approach to studying landowner behavior suggests that
existing models of policy design should be revised. We demonstrate that both Nash and
Stackelberg equilibrium rotation ages are longer than sole owner rotation ages when stands
are spatial substitutes, but Nash and Stackelberg ages are shorter than sole owner ages
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when stands are spatial complements. Clearly the scope for using taxes or subsidies to
adjust rotation ages toward their efficient levels depends on the nature of stand
interdependence regarding amenities, and also on the ability of landowners to commit to
rotation age actions. These ideas have not been previously uncovered, even within the
spatial forestry literature. In the end, the design of a proper Pigouvian tax system which
mimics the efficiency of the sole owner solution will be much more complicated than
previously thought. It would be useful to extend the optimal forest taxation analysis in the
Hartman framework by Koskela and Ollikainen (2003) for allow for stand
interdependencies. What we can learn from empirical work regarding this interdependence
will also be crucial to practical policy work.
Our work here suggests many other research topics, most of which are motivated
by the need to continue generalizing the modelling approach. As pointed out in the text
and illustrated in Appendix 1, it would be useful to understand interdependency when
adjacent stand rotation ages differ.  Here, the amenity value of each stand might depend on
the calendar age of the adjacent stand, as well as the dynamics of the steady-state
involving the two stands. Providing an analytical solution for this problem would be a
demanding and interesting topic for future research, but if solved it would provide an
analysis of transitional dynamics and identification of possible outcomes that might arise
as rotation ages adjust between various equilibria. For this reason, the application of our
model to uneven-aged managed forests with adjacent landowners would be interesting and
probably lead to different results.  In models where rotation ages of stands are different, we
expect that the asymmetries we identify between landowner interactions will continue to
exist and become even more complicated.
Finally, it is clear from our work that gains from cooperation among landowners
could be highly relevant to the application of any forest policy, especially if the policy
takes stand interdependency as its starting point. Analyzing the policy problem
theoretically, and quantifying and comparing the gains from different policy instruments in
the different equilibria we find here would be important in assessing the effectiveness and
scope for policy.
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Figure 1. Decreasing temporal dependence when the stands are spatial substitutes
Figure 2. Decreasing temporal dependence when the stands are spatial complements
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Figure 3. Increasing temporal dependence when the stands are spatial substitutes
Figure 4. Increasing temporal dependence when the stands are spatial complements
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TABLE 1. Comparative statics of the rotation age in Nash, Stackelberg, and sole owner
cases.
Solutions for stand a.*   ‘+’ indicates an increase in rotation age, while ‘-‘ indicates a decrease in
rotation age.  Marginal amenity function signs correspond to Definitions 1 and 2 in the text.
Exogenous
Parameter
Nash Rotation Age
( NT )
Stackelberg
Rotation Age
Leader
( ST )
Sole Owner
Rotation Age
( SOT )
Own stand price -      if 0aTF
+/-   otherwise
-
if 0aTF , 0
a
TF  ,
0aF

or
if 0aTF , 0
a
TF  ,
0aF

- If
0;0  bT
a
T FF
+/-   otherwise
Own-stand
regeneration cost
+ + +
Adjacent stand
price as 0aTF
+    if 0aTF
-     if  0aTF
+/- +   if
0
;0;0


a
T
ab
F
FF


- If
0
;0;0


a
T
ab
F
FF


Interest rate
-     if 0aTF
+/-  otherwise
+/- -  if
0

b
TF , 0
b
TF
+/- otherwise
Adjacent stand
regeneration cost
+  if 0aTF
-  if 0aTF
0
+ if 0aTF
-  if 0bTF
*By symmetry, the comparative statics results in the table would also hold for stand b, with the
parameters redefined for this stand.
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Appendix 1. Stand interdependence, present value of amenity benefits and different
rotation ages for stands.
Consider the amenity function for stand a  in the case of three rotations T  when the
rotation age of stand b  is T .  Assume that the first rotation for each stand begins with
bare land. The amenity function can be written as follows,
   









)2(3
)1(2
)1(2
)0(
)0(
)0(0
),2(),(),(
iT
iT
rta
iT
iT
rta
iT
i
rtaa dteitTtFdteitTtFdteittFE 
A1.1
where 0i initially and at the end of 1st rotation of stand a , 1i  at the end 2nd rotation of
stand a , and 2i  at the end 3rd rotation of stand a . We can describe the amenity function
for stand b  in an analogous way.  Differentiating equation A1.1. with respect to rotation
age T  yields,
   
  rTarTa
rTarTaarTaa
T
eTFeTTF
eTFeTTFFeTTFE
2)2,0()23,(
),0()2,()0,0(),(






A1.2
One can see from equation A1.2 that, in the presence of stand interdependence, the
dynamics of both stands should be included in the amenity value function for each stand if
rotation ages are different from each other. But, if rotation ages are equal, one ends up with
the specification presented in the text – this can be seen from A1.2.
In order to examine the amenity function with different rotation ages further, assume that
20T  and .30  Now, A1.1 and A1.2 can be expressed respectively as
   









)2(60
)1(40
)1(40
)0(20
)0(20
)0(0
)30,40()30,20(),(
i
i
rta
i
i
rta
i
i
rtaa dteittFdteittFdteittFE 
A1.3
and
   
  .4020
202020
)10,0()0,20(
)20,0()10,20()0,0()20,20(
rara
raraaraa
T
eFeF
eFeFFeFE




A1.4
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Appendix 2.  Proof of Lemma 1
The proof is given only for aNT , because the proof for 
bN
T  is analogous. The cross-
derivative aNT  can be re-expressed as

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
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









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
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

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rsa
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T e
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),(
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
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  A.2.1
 Temporal Independence: 0aTF      0
d
dT
Proof. If 0aTF , 
aN
T  reduces to
 rTaarTaaT eTFFeTF   ),(),0()1(),( 1   . There are two possibilities. If
0aF

, then trivially 0aNT . Under 0
aF

, 0aTF  implies
  )1(),(),0( rTarTaa eFeTFF  

  so that
0)1)(,()1(),( 1   rTrTT eTFeTF   . Hence, 0
d
dT .
 Increasing Temporal Dependence: 0aTF      0
d
dT
Proof.  i) If 0aF

 then  0aNT    rTT
rsa
a
e
r
dsesF
TF

 


1),(
),(
0



 . Now  0aTF  

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0
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 . Hence, 0aNT  so that 0
d
dT .
ii) If 0aF

 then  0aNT    rTT
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a
e
r
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TF

 

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),(
0



 . Now 0aTF  
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dT .
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 Decreasing Temporal Dependence: 0aTF      0
d
dT
Proof. i) If 0aF
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dT . Q.E.D.
Appendix 3. Proof of Lemma 2
Integrating the term dsesF rs
T
a 
 ),(
0


 in (8a) by parts and assuming that the third
derivative of the amenity function is zero, i.e. 0aTTF , we get
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
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  )),(),0((1),(),0(1 rTaT
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rTaa eTFF
r
eTFF
r


 A3.1
Under the quadratic amenity valuation function
2
2
1 )()(),(  TTTF , A3.2
with 0 , 0)( , we have )(),( 

TTF ,  and 

),(TF T .
Moreover, we define
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F             A3.3
Hence, we can express A3.1 as
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Using second-order approximation 22)2/1(1
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

  yields
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Now,
 For complements 0 , and under increasing temporal dependence
0),( 2  TTF a 

, while decreasing temporal dependence implies that
0),( 2  TTF a 

. Thus A3.5 is positive in both cases: the first one
automatically, the second one, because 
rT
TT


2
.
 For substitutes 0  condition A3.5 is automatically negative for decreasing
temporal dependence; and negative also under increasing temporal dependence,
because 
rT
TT


2
. QED.
Appendix 4: Second order conditions for the sole owner
The second order conditions rely on the following derivatives, from (10a) and (10b)
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Appendix 5.  Comparative statics of adjacent stand’s timber price and interest rate in
Stackelberg model
 Price (q):
By differentiation for the Stackelberg leader we obtain,
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where the term Tq  is defined as:
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Thus aSTq  consists of a shift in the follower’s reaction function as well as a change in its
slope in terms of  . The sign of all terms depends on the nature of temporal dependence
between the stands. On the basis of our previous analysis the sum of the first two terms
of eqn A5.1 in brackets are negative (positive) for increasing (decreasing) temporal
dependence. The third and fourth terms are of opposite sign, being positive (negative)
for increasing (decreasing) temporal dependence, indicating that the sign of aSTq  is a
priori ambiguous for both decreasing and increasing temporal dependence. For
temporally independent stands we have 0aSTq .
 Interest rate (r):
We first develop the cross-derivative of the follower’s reaction function, Tr (.).
Recalling equation (8b), the derivative with respect to r is,
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first two terms in braces depends on the sign of bTF   by Lemma 1. Approximating the 
term using 22)2/1(1
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. We determine the sign of the integral term
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0
 by using the quadratic amenity valuation function given in A.3.2 in Lemma
3.
Lemma 3. If the amenity valuation function is quadratic, then
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Proof. Integrating 


0
dxexF rxbT  by parts and assuming that the third derivative of the
amenity function is zero, i.e. that 0
TF , we get
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
00
dxexFdxeF rxbT
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T  A5.4
Under the quadratic amenity valuation function
2
2
1 )()(),(  TTTF ,  A5.5
A6.1 yields, so that we can write,
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For the second term we get via integration by parts that
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Given that A5.7 is positive, the sign of the integral 
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)( T  . Hence, we have shown that
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QED.
See Appendix6.
Hence, we have established that 0as0
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a
TTr F . Now the overall sign of the
three latter terms in aSTr  can be revealed. The first term is positive, but the last two
terms are negative when the stands exhibit increasing temporal dependence, while the
opposite holds for decreasing temporal dependence. Hence, the interest rate effect in the
Stackelberg game is genuinely ambiguous.
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Appendix 6.
Given (21a) and (21b) in the text, the first terms in TrW  and rW  are negative. Next we
study sign of the braced terms in the derivative TrW  (by symmetry this holds also for the
sign of the braced terms in rW ). According to Lemma 2 we have,
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Using Lemma 3 we have,
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Combining A6.2. and A6.3  gives
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Analogously we can write,
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Under plausible assumptions concerning the interest rate and rotation ages, the last term
in equations A6.4 and A6.5 dominates. Q.E.D.
